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Abstract
In 1976, Knuth [14] asked if the stable marriage problem (SMP) can be generalized
to marriages consisting of 3 genders. In 1988, Alkan [1] showed that the natural
generalization of SMP to 3 genders (3GSM) need not admit a stable marriage. Three
years later, Ng and Hirschberg [16] proved that it is NP-complete to determine if given
preferences admit a stable marriage. They further prove an analogous result for the 3
person stable assignment (3PSA) problem.
In light of Ng and Hirschberg’s NP-hardness result for 3GSM and 3PSA, we initiate
the study of approximate versions of these problems. In particular, we describe two op-
timization variants of 3GSM and 3PSA: maximally stable marriage/matching (MSM )
and maximum stable submarriage/submatching (MSS ). We show that both variants are
NP-hard to approximate within some fixed constant factor. Conversely, we describe a
simple polynomial time algorithm which computes constant factor approximations for
the maximally stable marriage and matching problems. Thus both variants of MSM
are APX-complete.
1 Introduction
1.1 Previous Work
Since Gale and Shapley first formalized and studied the stable marriage problem (SMP) in
1962 [5], many variants of the SMP have emerged (see, for example, [7, 14, 15, 19]). While
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many of these variants admit efficient algorithms, two notably do not1: (1) incomplete
preferences with ties [10], and (2) 3 gender stable marriages (3GSM) [16].
In the case of incomplete preferences with ties, it is NP-hard to find a maximum car-
dinality stable marriage [10]. The intractability of exact computation for this problem
led to the study of approximate versions of the problem. These investigations have re-
sulted in hardness of approximation results [9, 20] as well as constant factor approximation
algorithms [12, 13, 17, 20].
In 3GSM, players are one of three genders: women, men, and dogs (as suggested by
Knuth). Each player holds preferences over the set of pairs of players of the other two
genders. The goal is to partition the players into families, each consisting of one man, one
woman, and one dog, such that no triple mutually prefer one another to their assigned
families. In 1988, Alkan showed that for this natural generalization of SMP to three
genders, there exist preferences which do not admit a stable marriage [1]. In 1991, Ng
and Hirschberg showed that, in fact, it is NP-complete to determine if given preferences
admit a stable marriage [16]. They further generalize this result to the three person stable
assignment problem (3PSA). In 3PSA, each player ranks all pairs of other players without
regard to gender. The goal is to partition players into disjoint triples where again, no three
players mutually prefer each other to their assigned triples.
Despite the advances for stable marriages with incomplete preferences and ties (see [15]
for an overview of relevant work), analogous approximability results have not been obtained
for 3 gender variants of the stable marriage problem. In this paper, we achieve the first
substantial progress towards understanding the approximability of 3GSM and 3PSA.
1.2 Overview of our results
1.2.1 3 gender stable marriages (3GSM)
We formalize two optimization variants of 3GSM: maximally stable marriage (3G-MSM)
and maximum stable submarriage (3G-MSS). For 3G-MSM, we seek a perfect (3 dimen-
sional) marriage which minimizes the number of unstable triples—triples of players who
mutually prefer each other to their assigned families. For 3G-MSS, we seek a largest car-
dinality submarriage which contains no unstable triples among the married players. Exact
computation of both of these problems is NP-hard by Ng and Hirschberg’s result [16].
Indeed, exact computation of either allows one to detect the existence of a stable marriage.
We obtain the following inapproximability result for 3G-MSM and 3G-MSS.
Theorem 1.1 (Special case of Theorem 3.1). There exists an absolute constant c < 1 such
that it is NP-hard to approximate 3G-MSM and 3G-MSS to within a factor c.
In fact, we prove a slightly stronger result for 3G-MSM and 3G-MSS. We show that
the problem of determining if given preferences admit a stable marriage or if all marriages
1Assuming, of course, P6=NP!
2
are “far from stable” is NP-hard. See Section 2.1 and Theorem 3.1 for the precise state-
ments. In the other direction, we describe a polynomial time constant factor approximation
algorithm for 3G-MSM.
Theorem 1.2. There exists a polynomial time algorithm, AMSM, which computes a
4
9 -factor approximation to 3G-MSM.
Corollary 1.3. 3G-MSM is APX-complete.
1.2.2 Three person stable assignment (3PSA)
We also consider the three person stable assignment problem (3PSA). In this problem,
players rank all pairs of other players and seek a (3 dimensional) matching—a partition of
players into disjoint triples. Notions of stability, maximally stable matching, and maximum
stable submatching are defined exactly as the analogous notions for 3GSM. We show that
Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 have analogues with 3PSA:
Theorem 1.4. There exists a constant c < 1 such that it is NP-hard to approximate
3PSA-MSM and 3PSA-MSS to within a factor c.
Theorem 1.5. There exists a polynomial time algorithm, ASA, which computes a 49 -factor
approximation to 3PSA-MSM.
Our proofs of the lower bounds in Theorems 1.1 and 1.4 use a reduction from the 3
dimensional matching problem (3DM) to 3G-MSM. Kann [11] showed that Max-3DM is
Max-SNP complete. Thus, by the PCP theorem [2, 3] and [4], it is NP-complete to ap-
proximate Max-3DM to within some fixed constant factor. Our hardness of approximation
results then follow from a reduction from 3DM to 3G-MSM.
Theorems 1.2 and 1.5 follow from a simple greedy algorithm. Our algorithm constructs
marriages (or matchings) by greedily finding triples whose members are guaranteed to
participate in relatively few unstable triples. Thus, we are able to efficiently construct
marriages (or matchings) with a relatively small fraction of blocking triples.
2 Background and Definitions
2.1 3 Gender Stable Marriage (3GSM)
In the 3 gender stable marriage problem, there are disjoint sets of women , men , and
dogs denoted by A (for Alice), B (for Bob), and D (for Dog), respectively. We assume
|A| = |B| = |D| = n, and we denote the collection of players by V = A ∪ B ∪ D. A
family is a triple abd consisting of one woman a ∈ A, one man b ∈ B, and one dog d ∈ D.
A submarriage S is a set of pairwise disjoint families. A marriage M is a maximal
submarriage—that is, one in which every player v ∈ V is contained in some (unique) family
so that |M | = n. Given a submarriage S, we denote the function pS : V → V 2∪{∅} which
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assigns each player v ∈ V to their partners in S, with pS(v) = ∅ if v is not contained in
any family in S.
Each player v ∈ V has a preference , denoted v over pairs of members of the other
two genders. That is, each woman a ∈ A holds a total order a over B × D ∪ {∅}, and
similarly for men and dogs. We assume that each player prefers being in some family to
having no family. For example, bd a ∅ for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B and d ∈ D. An instance of
the three gender stable marriage problem (3GSM ) consists of A, B, and D together
with a set P = {v | v ∈ V } of preferences for each v ∈ V .
Given a submarriage S, a triple abd is an unstable triple if a, b and d each prefer the
triple abd to their assigned families in S. That is, abd is unstable if and only if bd a pS(a),
ad b pS(b), and ab d pS(d). A triple abd which is not unstable is stable . In particular,
abd is stable if at least one of a, b and d prefers their family in S to abd. Let AS , BS
and DS be the sets of women, men and dogs (respectively) which have families in S. A
submarriage S is stable if there are no unstable triples in AS ×BS ×DS .
Unlike the two gender stable marriage problem, this three gender variant arbitrary
preferences need not admit a stable marriage. In fact, for some preferences, every marriage
has many unstable triples (see Section 3.1). Thus we consider two optimization variants of
the three gender stable marriage problem.
2.1.1 Maximally Stable Marriage (3G-MSM)
The maximally stable marriage problem (3G-MSM) is to find a marriage M with
the maximum number of stable triples with respect to given preferences P . For fixed
preferences P and marriage M , the stability of M with respect to P is the number of
stable triples in A×B ×D:
stab(M) = |{abd | abd is stable}| .
Thus, M is stable if and only if stab(M) = n3. Dually, we define the instability of M by
ins(M) = n3 − stab(M). For fixed preferences P , we define
MSM(P ) = max {stab(M) |M is a marriage} .
For preferences P and fixed c < 1, we define Gapc-3G-MSM to be the problem of
determining if MSM(P ) = n3 or MSM(P ) ≤ cn3.
2.1.2 Maximum Stable Submarriage
The maximum stable submarriage problem (3G-MSS) is to find a maximum cardi-
nality stable submarriage S. We denote
MSS(P ) = max {|S| |S is a stable submarriage}
Note that P admits a stable marriage if and only if MSS(P ) = n. For fixed c < 1, we define
Gapc-3G-MSS to be the problem of determining if MSS(P ) = n or if MSS(P ) ≤ cn.
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2.2 Three person stable assignment (3PSA)
In the three person stable assignment problem (3PSA), there is a set U of |U | = 3n
players who wish to be partitioned into n disjoint triples. For a set C ⊆ U , we denote
the set of k-subsets of C by
(
C
k
)
. A submatching is a set S ⊆ (U3) of disjoint triples in
U . A matching M is a maximal submatching—a submatching with |M | = n. Given a
submatching S, US is the set of players contained in some triple in S:
US = {u ∈ U |u ∈ t for some t ∈ S} .
Each player u ∈ U holds preferences among all pairs of potential partners. That is, each
u ∈ U holds a linear order u on
(
U\{u}
2
) ∪ {∅}. We assume that each player prefers
every pair to an empty assignment. Given a set P of preferences for all the players and
a submatching S, we call a triple uvw ∈ (US3 ) unstable if each of u, v and w prefer the
triple uvw to their assigned triples in S. Otherwise, we call uvw stable . A submatching
S is stable if it contains no unstable triples in
(
US
3
)
. We define the stability of S by
stab(S) =
∣∣∣∣{uvw ∈ (US3
) ∣∣∣∣uvw is stable}∣∣∣∣ .
Dually, the instability of S is ins(S) =
(|S|
3
)− stab(S).
The maximally stable matching problem (3PSA-MSM ) is to find a matching
M which maximizes stab(M). The maximum stable submatching problem (3PSA-
MSS) is to find a stable submatching S of maximum cardinality.
Remark 2.1. We may consider a variant of 3PSA with unacceptable partners. In this
variant, each player u ∈ U ranks only a subset of (U\{u}2 ), and prefers being unmatched to
unranked pairs. 3GSM is a special case of this variant where U = A∪B∪D and each player
ranks precisely those pairs consisting of one player of each other gender. This observation
will make our hardness results for 3GSM easily generalize to 3PSA.
2.3 Hardness of Gapc-3DM-3
Our proofs of Theorems 1.1 and 1.4 use a reduction from the three dimensional matching
problem (3DM). In this section, we briefly review 3DM, and state the approximability
result we require for our lower bound results.
Let W , X and Y be finite disjoint sets with |W | = |X| = |Y | = m. Let E ⊆W ×X×Y
be a set of edges. A matching M ⊆ E is a set of disjoint edges. The maximum 3
dimensional matching problem (Max-3DM ) is to find (the size of) a matching M of
largest cardinality in E. Max-3DM-3 is the restriction of Max-3DM to instances where
each element in W ∪X ∪ Y is contained in at most 3 edges. For a fixed constant c < 1, we
define Gapc-3DM-3 to be the problem of determining if an instance I of Max-3DM-3 has
a perfect matching (a matching M of size m) or if every matching has size at most cm.
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Theorem 2.2. There exists an absolute constant c < 1 such that Gapc-3DM-3 is NP-hard.
Kann showed that Max-3DM-3 is Max-SNP complete2 by giving an L-reduction from
Max-3SAT-B to Max-3DM-3 [11]. By the celebrated PCP theorem [2, 3] and [4], Kann’s
result immediately implies that Max-3DM-3 is NP-hard to approximate to within some
fixed constant factor. However, Kann’s reduction gives a slightly weaker result than The-
orem 2.2. In Kann’s reduction, satisfiable instances of 3SAT-B do not necessarily reduce
to instances of 3DM-3 which admit perfect matchings. In Appendix A, we describe how
to alter Kann’s reduction so that satisfiable instances of 3SAT-B admit perfect matchings,
while far-from-satisfiable instances are far from admitting perfect matchings.
3 Hardness of Approximation
In this section, we prove the main hardness of approximation results. Specifically, we will
prove the following theorems.
Theorem 3.1. Gapc-3G-MSM and Gapc-3G-MSS are NP-hard.
Theorem 3.2. There exists an absolute constant c < 1 such that Gapc-3PSA-MSM and
Gapc-3PSA-MSS are NP-hard.
3.1 Preferences for 3GSM with Many Unstable Triples
Theorem 3.3. There exist preferences P for 3GSM and a constant c < 1 for which
MSM(P ) ≤ cn3.
We describe preferences P for which every marriage has Ω(n3) blocking triples below.
Assuming n is even, we partition each gender into two equal sized sets A = A1 ∪ A2,
B = B1 ∪B2, and D = D1 ∪D2
player preferences
a1 ∈ A1 B1D1 B2D2 · · ·
a2 ∈ A2 B2D1 · · ·
b1 ∈ B1 A1D1 · · ·
b2 ∈ B2 A1D2 A2D1 · · ·
d1 ∈ D1 A2B2 A1D1 · · ·
d2 ∈ D2 A1B2 · · ·
The sets appearing in the preferences indicate that the player prefers all pairs in that set
(in any order) followed by the remaining preferences. For example, all a1 ∈ A1 prefer all
partners bd ∈ B1 × D1, followed by all partners in B2 × D2, followed by all other pairs
in arbitrary order. Within B1 ×D1 and B2 ×D2, a1’s preferences are arbitrary. The full
proof of Theorem 3.3 is given in Appendix B.
2The complexity class Max-SNP was introduced by Papadimitriou and Yannakakis in [18], where the
authors also show that Max-3SAT-B is Max-SNP complete.
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3.2 The Embedding
We now describe an embedding of 3DM-3 into 3G-MSM. Our embedding is a modification
of the embedding described by Ng and Hirschberg [16]. Let I be an instance of 3DM-3 with
ground sets W,X, Y and edge set E. We assume |W | = |X| = |Y | = m. We will construct
an instance f(I) of 3G-MSM with sets A,B and D of women, men and dogs of size n = 6m
and suitable preferences P . We divide each gender into two sets A = A1∪A2, B = B1∪B2
and D = D1 ∪D2 where ∣∣Aj∣∣ = ∣∣Bj∣∣ = ∣∣Dj∣∣ = 3m for j = 1, 2. Let W = {a1, a2, . . . , am},
X = {b1, b2, . . . , bm} and Y = {d1, d2, . . . , dm}, and denote
E =
n⋃
i=1
{aibk1d`1 , aibk2d`2 , aibk3d`3} .
Without loss of generality, we assume each ai is contained in exactly 3 edges by possibly
increasing the multiplicity of edges containing ai. For j = 1, 2, we form sets
Aj =
{
aji [k]
∣∣∣ i ∈ [n], k ∈ [3]} , Bj = {bji , wji , yji ∣∣∣ i ∈ [n]} , Dj = {dji , xji , zji ∣∣∣ i ∈ [n]}
for j = 1, 2. We now define preferences for each set of players, beginning with those in A.
a1i [m] w
1
i x
1
i y
1
i z
1
i b
1
km
d1`m B
1D1 B2D2 · · ·
a2i [m] w
2
i x
2
i y
2
i z
2
i b
2
km
d2`m B
2D1 · · ·
The players in B have preferences given by
w1i a
1
i [1]x
1
i a
1
i [2]x
1
i a
1
i [3]x
1
i A
1D1 · · ·
y1i a
1
i [1]z
1
i a
1
i [2]z
1
i a
1
i [3]z
1
i A
1D1 · · ·
b1i A
1D1 · · ·
w2i a
2
i [1]x
2
i a
2
i [2]x
2
i a
2
i [3]x
2
i A
1D2 A2D1 · · ·
y2i a
2
i [1]z
2
i a
2
i [2]z
2
i a
2
i [3]z
2
i A
1D2 A2D1 · · ·
b2i A
1D2 A2D1 · · ·
The preferences for D are given by
x1i a
1
i [3]w
1
i a
1
i [2]w
1
i a
1
i [3]w
1
i A
2B2 A1B1 · · ·
z1i a
1
i [3]y
1
i a
1
i [2]y
1
i a
1
i [3]y
1
i A
2B2 A1B1 · · ·
d1i A
2B2 A1B1 · · ·
x2i a
2
i [3]w
2
i a
2
i [2]w
2
i a
2
i [3]w
2
i A
1B2 · · ·
z2i a
2
i [3]y
2
i a
2
i [2]y
2
i a
2
i [3]y
2
i A
1B2 · · ·
d2i A
1B2 · · ·
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The sets Aj , Bj and Dj in the preferences described above indicate that all players in these
sets appear consecutively in some arbitrary order in the preferences. Ellipses indicate that
all remaining preferences may be completed arbitrarily. For example, a11[1] most prefers
w11x
1
1, followed by y
1
1z
1
1 and b
1
km
d1`m . She then prefers all remaining pairs in B
1D1 in any
order, followed by all pairs in B2D2, followed by the remaining pairs in any order.
Lemma 3.4. The embedding f : 3DM-3 −→ 3GSM described above satisfies
1. If opt(I) = m—that is, I admits a perfect matching—then f(I) admits a stable
marriage (i.e. MSM(P ) = n3).
2. If opt(I) ≤ cm for some c < 1, then there exists a constant c′ < 1 depending only on
c such that MSM(P ) ≤ c′n3.
Proof. To prove the first claim assume, without loss of generality, thatM ′ = {aibk1d`1 | i ∈ [n]}
is a perfect matching in E. It is easy to verify the marriage
M =
{
aji [1]b
j
k1
dj`1
}
∪
{
aji [2]w
j
ix
j
i
}
∪
{
aji [3]y
j
i z
j
i
}
contains no blocking triples, hence is a stable marriage.
For the second claim, let M be an arbitrary marriage in A×B ×D. We observe that
there are at least (1 − c)m players a1 ∈ A1 and (1 − c)m players a2 ∈ A2 that are not
matched with pairs from their top three choices. Suppose to the contrary that α > (2+c)m
players a1 ∈ A1 are matched with their top 3 choices. This implies that more than cm
women a1 ∈ A1 are matched in triples of the form a1b1kd1` with abkd` ∈ E, implying that E
contains a matching of size α− 2m > cm, a contradiction. Thus at least 2(1− c)m women
in A1 ∪A2 are matched below their top three choices.
Let A′ denote the set of women matched below their top three choices, and B′ andD′ the
sets of partners of a ∈ A′ in M . By the previous paragraph, |A′| ≥ 2(1−c)m = (1−c)m/6.
Further, the relative preferences of players in A′, B′ and D′ are precisely those described
in Theorem 3.3. Thus, by Theorem 3.3, any marriage M among these players induces at
least |A′|3 /128 blocking triples. Hence M must contain at least
|A′|
128
≥ (1− c)
3
3456
n3
blocking triples.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The reduction f : 3DM-3 −→ 3GSM is easily seen to be polynomial
time computable. Thus, by Lemma 3.4, f is a polynomial time reduction from Gapc-3DM-
3 to Gapc′-3G-MSM where c
′ = 1− (1− c)3/3456. The NP hardness of Gapc-3G-MSM is
then an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.2.
The hardness of Gapc-3G-MSS is a consequence of the hardness Gapc-3G-MSM. Con-
sider an instance of 3GSM with preferences P . We make the following observations.
8
1. MSM(P ) = n3 if and only if MSS(P ) = n.
2. If MSM(P ) ≤ (1− 3ε)n3 for ε > 0, then MSS(P ) ≤ (1− ε)n.
The first observation is clear. To prove the second, suppose that MSS(P ) > (1− ε)n, and
let S be a maximum stable submarriage. We can form a marriage M by arbitrarily adding
εn disjoint families to S. Since each new family can induce at most 3n2 blocking triples,
M has at most 3εn3 blocking triples, hence MSM(P ) > (1− 3ε)n3. The two observations
above imply that any decider for Gap(1−ε)-3G-MSS is also a decider for Gap(1−3ε)-3G-
MSM. Thus, the NP-hardness of Gapc-3G-MSM immediately implies the analogous result
for Gapc-3G-MSS.
A sketch of the proof of analogous lower bounds for 3PSA is given in Appendix C.1.
4 Approximation Algorithms
4.1 3GSM approximation
In this section, we describe a polynomial time approximation algorithm for MSM, thereby
proving Theorem 1.2. Consider an instance of 3GSM with preferences P , and as before
A = {a1, a2, . . . , an}, B = {b1, b2, . . . , bn}, and D = {d1, d2, . . . , dn}. Given a triple aibjdk,
we define its stable set Sijk to be the set of (indices of) triples which cannot form unstable
triples with aibjdk. Specifically, we have
Sijk =
{
αβδ ∈ [n]3 ∣∣ bβdδ ai bjdk, α = i} ∪ {αβδ ∈ [n]3 ∣∣ aαdδ bj aidk, β = j}
∪ {αβδ ∈ [n]3 ∣∣ aαbβ dk aibj , δ = k}
The idea of our algorithm is to greedily form families that maximize |Sijk|. Pseudocode is
given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 AMSM(A,B,D, P )
find ijk ∈ [n]3 which maximize |Sijk|
A′ ← A \ {ai}, B′ ← B \ {bj}, D′ ← D \ {dk}
P ′ ← P restricted to A′, B′, and D′
return {aibjdk}∪AMSM(A′, B′, D′, P ′)
It is easy to see that AMSM can be implemented in polynomial time. The naive
algorithm for computing |Sijk| for fixed ijk ∈ [n]3 by iterating through all triples αβδ ∈ [n]3
and querying each player’s preferences can be implemented in time O˜(n3). The maximal
such |Sijk| can then be found by iterating through all ijk ∈ [n]3. Thus the first step
in AMSM can be accomplished in time O˜(n6). Finally, the recursive step of AMSM
terminates after n iterations, as each iteration decreases the size of A, B, and D by one.
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Lemma 4.1. For any preferences P , and sets A, B and D with |A| = |B| = |D| = n, there
exists a triple ijk ∈ [n]3 with
|Sijk| ≥ 4n
2
3
− n− 1. (1)
Proof. We will show that there exists a triple aibjdk such that at least two of ai, bj , and
dk respectively rank bjdk, aidk, and aibj among their top n
2/3 + 1 choices. Note that this
occurs precisely when at least two of the the following inequalities are satisfied∣∣{βδ ∈ [n]2 ∣∣ bβdδ ai bjdk}∣∣ ≤ n23 + 1, ∣∣{αδ ∈ [n]2 ∣∣ aαdδ bj aidk}∣∣ ≤ n23 + 1,
and
∣∣{αβ ∈ [n]2 ∣∣ aαbβ dk aibj}∣∣ ≤ n23 + 1
Mark each triple aibjdk which satisfies one of the above inequalities. Each ai induces
n2
3 +1
marks, so we get n
3
3 + n marks from all a ∈ A. Similarly, we get n
3
3 + n marks from B
and D. Thus, marks are placed on at least n3 + 3n triples. By the pigeonhole principle, at
least one triple is marked twice.
We claim that the triple aibjdk satisfying two of the above inequalities satisfies equa-
tion (1). Without loss of generality, assume that aibjdk satisfies the first two equations.
Thus, ai and bj must each contribute at least
2n3
3 − 1 stable triples with respect to aibjdk.
Further, at most n − 1 such triples can be contributed by both ai and bj , as such triples
must be of the form aibjdδ for δ 6= k. Thus (1) is satisfied, as desired.
We are now ready to prove that AMSM gives a constant factor approximation for the
maximally stable marriage problem.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. Let M be the marriage found by AMSM, and suppose
M = {a1b1d1, a2b2d2, . . . , anbndn}
where a1b1d1 is the first triple found by AMSM, a2b2d2 is the second, et cetera. By
Lemma 4.1, |S111| ≥ 43n2−O(n). Therefore, the players a1, b1, and d1 can be contained in
at most 53n
2+O(n) unstable triples in any marriage containing the family a1b1d1. Similarly,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n the ith family aibidi can contribute at most 53(n− i+1)2+O(n) new unstable
triples (not containing any aj , bj , or dj for j < i). Thus, the total number of unstable
triples in M is at most
n∑
i=1
(
5
3
(n− i+ 1)2 +O(n)
)
=
5
9
n3 +O(n2).
Thus, we have stab(M) ≥ 4n3/9−O(n2) as desired.
A proof of the analogous result for 3PSA (Theorem 1.5) is given in Appendix C.2.
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5 Concluding Remarks and Open Questions
While AMSM gives a simple approximation algorithm for 3G-MSM, we do not generalize
this result to 3G-MSS. Indeed, even the first two families output by AMSM may include
blocking triples. We leave the existence of an efficient approximation for 3G-MSS as a
tantalizing open question.
Open Problem 5.1. Is it possible to efficiently compute a constant factor approximation
to 3G-MSS?
Finding an approximation algorithm for maximally stable marriage was made easier
by the fact that any preferences admit a marriage/matching with Ω(n3) stable triples.
However, for 3G-MSS, it is not clear whether every preference structure admits stable
submarriages of size Ω(n). We feel that understanding the approximability of 3G-MSS is
a very intriguing avenue of further exploration.
Open Problem 5.2. How small can a maximum stable submarriage/submatching be?
What preferences achieve this bound?
In our hardness of approximation results (Theorems 3.1 and 3.2), we do not state
explicit values of c for which Gapc-3G-MSM and Gapc-3G-MSS (and the corresponding
problems for three person stable assignment) are NP-complete. The value implied by
our embedding of 3SAT-B via 3DM-3 is quite close to 1. It would be interesting to find a
better (explicit) factor for hardness of approximation. Conversely, is it possible to efficiently
achieve a better than 4/9-factor approximation for maximally stable marriage/matching
problems?
Open Problem 5.3. For the maximally stable marriage/matching problems, close the
gap between the 4/9-factor approximation algorithm and the (1 − ε)-factor hardness of
approximation.
The preference structure described in the proof of Theorem 3.3 (upon which our hard-
ness of approximation results rely), there exist many quartets of pairs b1d1, b2d2, b1, d3,
and b2d4 such that b1d1 a b2d2 and b2d4 a b1d3. Thus a does not consistently prefer
pairs including b1 to those including b2 or vice versa. Ng and Hirschberg describe such
preferences as inconsistent , and asked whether consistent preferences always admit a (3
gender) stable marriage. Huang [8] showed that consistent preferences need not admit sta-
ble marriages, and indeed it is NP-complete to determine whether or not given consistent
preferences admit a stable marriage.
Open Problem 5.4. Are MSM and MSS still hard to approximate if preferences are
restricted to be consistent?
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A Hardness of Gapc-3DM-3
The goal of this section is to prove Theorem 2.2, the NP hardness of Gapc-3DM-3. In
the first subsection, we review Kann’s reduction from Max-3SAT-B to Max-3DM -3. In
the following subsection, we describe how to modify Kann’s reduction in order to obtain
Theorem 2.2.
A.1 Kann’s reduction
Let I be an instance of 3SAT-B. Specifically, I consists of a set U of n Boolean variables,
U = {u1, u2, . . . , un} ,
and a set C of m clauses
C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} .
Each clause is a disjunction of at most 3 literals, and each variable ui or its negation
ui appears in at most B clauses. For each i ∈ [n], let di denote the number of clauses
in which ui or ui appears, where di ≤ B. Kann’s construction begins with the classical
reduction from 3SAT to 3DM used to show the NP-completeness of 3DM, as described
in [6]. Each variable ui gets mapped to a ring of 2di edges. The points of the ring
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correspond alternatingly to ui and ui. A maximal matching on the ring corresponds to
a choice a truth value of ui: if the edges containing the vertices labeled ui are in the
matching, this corresponds to ui having the value true; if the edges containing ui are
chosen, this corresponds to ui taking the value false. See Fig 1.
In the classical construction, the points of the ring corresponding to ui are connected
to clause vertices via clause edges which encode the clauses in C. This is done in such
a way that the formula I is satisfiable if and only if the corresponding matching problem
admits a perfect matching. The problem with this embedding, however, is that even if a
relatively small fraction of clauses in C can be simultaneously satisfied, the corresponding
matching problem may still admit a nearly perfect matching.
To remedy this problem, Kann’s reduction maps each Boolean variable ui to many rings.
The rings are then connected via a tree structure whose roots correspond to instances of
ui in the clauses of C. This tree structure imposes a predictable structure on the maximal
matchings.
We denote the parameter
K = 2blog(3B/2+1)c
which is the number of rings to which each variable ui maps. We denote the “free
elements”—the points on the rings—associate to ui by the variables
vi[γ, k] and vi[γ, k] for 1 ≤ γ ≤ di, 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
These vertices are connected to rings as in Figure 1. The rings are connected via tree
edges in 2di binary trees, such that for each fixed γ, vi[γ, 1], vi[γ, 2], . . . , vi[γ,K] are the
leaves of a tree, and similarly for the vi[γ, k]. We label the root of this tree by ui[γ] or ui[γ]
depending on the labels of the leaves. See Figure 2. We refer to the resulting structure for
ui as the ring of trees corresponding to ui.
The root vertices are connected via clause edges to clause vertices. For each cj ∈ C,
we associate two clause vertices s1[j] and s2[j]. If cj is ui’s γ-th clause in C, then we include
the edge
{ui[γ], s1[j], s2[j]} or {ui[γ], s1[j], s2[j]}
depending if ui or its negation appears in cj and the parity of the of the tree of rings. We
denote the resulting instance of 3DM by f(I). It is readily apparent from this construction
that f(I) is in fact an instance of 3DM-3: all vertices in the rings of trees are contained in
exactly 2 edges, while clause vertices are contained in at most 3 edges. Further, the vertex
set V can be partitioned into a disjoint union W ∪X ∪Y such that each edge contains one
vertex from each of these sets. Kann makes the following observations about the structure
of optimal (maximum) matchings in f(I).
Lemma A.1. Let I be an instance of 3SAT-B. Let f(I) be an instance of 3DM-3 con-
structed as above. Then each optimal matching M in f(I) is associated with an optimal
assignment in I, and has the following structure.
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v[1, k]
v[1, k]
v[2, k]
v[3, k]
v[4, k]
v[2, k]v[3, k]
v[4, k]
Figure 1: The ring structure for the embedding of 3SAT-B into 3DM-3. The ring shown
corresponds to a variable ui with di = 4. An optimal matching in the ring corresponds to
a truth value of for the variable ui: the blue edges correspond to the value true while the
green edges correspond to the value false.
1. For each variable ui, M contains either all edges containing vi[γ, k] or all the edges
containing vi[γ, k], depending on the value ui in the optimal assignment for I.
2. From each ring of trees, alternating tree edges are included in M so as to cover all
tree (and ring) vertices, except possibly root vertices.
3. If cj is satisfied in the optimal assignment in I, then M contains an edge containing
s1[j] and s2[j].
4. If cj is unsatisfied in the optimal assignment in I, then none of the edges containing
s1[j] and s2[j] are contained in M .
In particular, the only possible vertices left uncovered in an optimal matching are clause
vertices corresponding to unsatisfied clauses and root vertices.
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As a consequence of Kann’s analysis of the optimal matchings in f(I), he is able to
show that f is an L-reduction from 3SAT-B to 3DM-3.
A.2 Modification of Kann’s reduction
In this section, we describe a reduction f ′ : 3SAT-B −→ 3DM-3 such that for each
satisfiable instance I of 3SAT-B, f ′(I) admits a perfect matching. In the reduction f
above, even if I is satisfiable, there may be many root vertices that are not in an optimal
matching, M . In particular, if a clause cj is satisfied by ui and ui′ , then at most one of the
edges
{ui[γ], s1[j], s2[j]} and
{
ui′ [γ
′], s1[j], s2[j]
}
can appear in M . Hence, at most one of ui[γ] and ui′ [γ
′] can appear in M . To remedy this
problem, we define f ′(I) to be the disjoint union of three copies of f(I)
f ′(I) = f(I)1 unionsq f(I)2 unionsq f(I)3.
We then add an edge for each root vertex in f(I) that contains the corresponding root
vertices in each disjoint copy of f(I). Specifically, if ui[γ]1, ui[γ]2, and ui[γ]3 are the three
copies in f ′(I) of a root vertex ui[γ] in f(I), then we include the edge
{ui[γ]1, ui[γ]2, ui[γ]3} (2)
in f ′(I). We now describe the structure of optimal matchings M ′ in f ′(I). Let M1, M2,
and M3 be the restrictions of an optimal matching M
′ for f ′(I) to f(I)1, f(I)2, and f(I)3
respectively. Thus, we can write
M ′ = M1 ∪M2 ∪M3 ∪R (3)
where R contains those edges in M ′ of the form (2).
Lemma A.2. There exists an optimal matching M ′ for f ′(I) such that the matchings M1,
M2, and M3 contain precisely the same edges as an optimal matching M for f(I).
Proof. Suppose M ′ is an optimal matching for f ′(I). We may assume without loss of
generality that the matchings M1, M2 and M3 are all identical to some matching M on
f(I). Indeed, if, say M1 is the largest of the three matchings, we can increase the size of
M ′ by replacing M2 and M3 with identical copies of M1. Since the only edges between
M1, M2, and M3 are edges of the form (2), replacing M2 and M3 with copies of M1 cannot
decrease the size of M ′. Thus, we may assume that∣∣M ′∣∣ = 3 |M |+ |R|
where M is some matching on f(I), and R consists of edges of the form (2).
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We will now argue that M is indeed an optimal matching on f(I), hence has the form
described in Lemma A.1. Notice that if M is optimal for f(I), then by including all edges
in R containing uncovered root vertices, M ′ covers every ring, tree, and root vertex. Thus,
the only way to obtain a larger matching would be to include more clause edges. However,
by Lemma A.1, including more clause edges cannot increase the size of the matching M .
Thus, we may assume M is an optimal matching for f(I).
Corollary A.3. If I is an instance of 3-SAT-B with m clauses and opt(I) = cm for some
c ≤ 1, then an optimal matching M ′ in f ′(I) leaves precisely 6(1− c)m vertices uncovered.
Lemma A.4. There exists a constant C > 0 depending only on B such that the number
of vertices in f ′(I) is at most Cm.
Proof. We bound the number of ring, tree, and clause vertices separately. Since the vertex
set of f ′(I) consists of three disjoint copies of the vertices in f(I), it suffices to bound the
number of vertices in f(I).
Ring vertices For each variable ui, there are K = O(B) rings, each consisting of 4di =
O(B). Thus there are O(B2) ring vertices for each variable ui, hence a total of
O(B2n) ring vertices in f(I).
Tree vertices Since each ring vertex of the form vi[γ, k] is the leaf of a complete binary
tree whose internal nodes and root are tree vertices, there are O(B2n) tree vertices
in f(I).
Clause vertices There two vertices s1[j] and s2[j] associated to each of m clauses, hence
there are O(m) clauses in total.
Therefore, the total number of vertices in f(I) and hence f ′(I) is O(m + B2n). Clearly,
we may assume that n ≤ m, so that there are O(B2m) vertices in f ′(I).
Corollary A.5. Let I be an instance of 3SAT-B, and let M∗ = 13 |f ′(I)| = |f(I)| be the
number of vertices in f(I). Then for any c < 1, there exists a constant c′ < 1 depending
only on c and B such that:
• if opt(I) = m (i.e., I is satisfiable) then opt(f ′(I)) = M∗;
• if opt(I) ≤ cm then opt(f ′(I)) ≤ c′M∗.
Theorem 2.2 follows immediately from Corollary A.5 and the following incarnation of
the PCP theorem.
Theorem A.6 (PCP Theorem [3, 2, 4]). There exist a absolute constants c < 1 and B
such that it is NP-hard to determine if an instance I of 3SAT-B satisfies opt(I) = m or
opt(I) ≤ cm.
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B Preferences with Many Unstable Triples
We first consider the case where n = 2. We denote A = {a1, a2}, B = {b1, b2}, and
D = {d1, d2}. Consider preference lists P as described in the following table, where most
preferred partners are listed first.
player preferences
a1 b1d1 b2d2 · · ·
a2 b2d1 · · ·
b1 a1d1 · · ·
b2 a1d2 a2d1 · · ·
d1 a2b2 a1b1 · · ·
d2 a1b2 · · ·
The ellipses indicate that the remaining preferences are otherwise arbitrary. Suppose M
is a stable marriage for P . We must have either a1b1d1 ∈M or a1b2d2 ∈M , for otherwise
the triple a1b2d2 is unstable. However, if a1b1d1 ∈ M , then a2b2d1 is unstable. On the
other hand, if a1b2d2 ∈M then a1b1d1 is unstable. Therefore, no such stable M exists. In
particular, every marriage M contains at least one unstable triple.
The idea of the proof of Theorem 3.3 is to choose preferences P such that when restricted
to many sets of two women, two men and two dogs, the preferences are as above. Thus
any marriage containing families consisting of these players must induce unstable triples.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. We partition the sets A, B and D each into two sets of equal size:
A = A1 ∪ A2, B = B1 ∪ B2, D = D1 ∪ D2. Consider the preferences P described in
Section 3.1. We will prove that for P , every matching M contains at least n3/128 unstable
triples. Let M be an arbitrary marriage, and suppose ins(M) < n3/128. We consider two
cases separately.
Case 1: |M ∩ (A1 ×B1 ×D1)| ≤ n/4. Let A′1, B′1 and D′1 be the subsets of A1, B1 and
D1 respectively of players not in triples contained in A1×B1×D1. By the hypothesis,
|A′1| , |B′1| , |D′1| ≥ n/4. Let d1 ∈ D′1. Notice that if pM (d1) /∈ A2 ×B2, then a1b1d1 is
unstable for all a1 ∈ A′1, b2 ∈ B′1. Since fewer than n3/128 triples in A′1 × B′1 ×D′1
are unstable, at least 3n/8 dogs d1 ∈ D′1 must have families a2b2d1 ∈ A2 ×B2 ×D′1.
Since |M ∩ (A2 ×B2 ×D1)| ≥ 3n/8, we must have |M ∩ (A1 ×B2 ×D2)| ≤ n/8.
Thus, there must be at least n/8 women a1 ∈ A1 with partners not in (B1 ×D1) ∪
(B2 ×D2). However, every such a1 forms an unstable triple with every b2 ∈ B2 and
d2 ∈ D2 which are not in families in A1×B2×D2. Since there at least 3n/8 such b2
and d2, there are at least (n
8
)(3n
8
)(
3n
8
)
>
n
128
blocking triples, a contradiction.
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Case 2: |M ∩ (A1 ×B1 ×D1)| > n/4. In this case, we must have |M ∩ (A2 ×B2 ×D1)| <
n/4. This implies that
|M ∩ (A1 ×B2 ×D2)| > 3n/8 (4)
for otherwise triples a2b2d1 ∈ (A2×B2×D1) with pM (b2) /∈ A1×D1 form more than
n3/128 unstable triples. But (4) contradicts the Case 2 hypothesis, as |A1| = n/2.
Since both cases lead to a contradiction, we may conclude that any M contains at least
n3/128 unstable triples, as desired.
C Results for 3PSA
In this appendix, we prove our main results for 3PSA, Theorems 3.2 and 1.5.
C.1 3PSA hardness of approximation
Proof sketch of Theorem 3.2. As noted in Remark 2.1, we may view 3GSM as a special
case of 3PSA with incomplete preferences. The NP-hardness of approximation of 3PSA
with incomplete preferences is analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.1. Given an instance
I of 3GSM with sets A, B, and D and preferences P , take U = A∪B ∪D and form 3PSA
preferences P ′ by appending the remaining pairs to P arbitrarily. Analogues of Theorem
3.3 and Lemma 3.4 hold for this instance of 3PSA, whence Theorem 3.2 follows. We leave
details to the reader.
C.2 3PSA approximation
AMSM can easily be adapted for 3PSA. Let U be a set of players with |U | = 3n, and let
P be a set of complete preferences for the players in U . Given a triple abc ∈ (U3), we form
the stable set Sabc consisting of triples that at least one of a, b, c does not prefer to abc.
The approximation algorithm ASA for 3PSA is analogous to AMSM: form a matching
M by finding a triple abc that maximizes |Sabc|, then recursing. The following lemma and
its proof are analogous to Lemma 4.1.
Lemma C.1. For any set U of players with |U | = 3n and complete preferences P , there
exists a triples abc ∈ (U3) such that
|Sabc| ≥ 6n2 −O(n).
Using Lemma C.1, we prove Theorem 1.5 analogously to Theorem 1.2.
Proof of Theorem 1.5. Each triple abc can intersect at most 3
(
3n
2
) ≤ 272 n2 blocking triples.
Thus, by Lemma C.1, the total number blocking triples in the matching M found by ASA
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is at most
n−1∑
i=0
(
15
2
(n− i+ 1)2 +O(n)
)
=
5
2
n3 +O(n2).
Therefore,
stab(M) ≥ 2n3 −O(n2),
as the total number of triples in
(
U
3
)
is 92n
3 − O(n2). Hence M is a 49 -approximation to a
maximally stable matching, as desired.
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ui[γ]
v[γ, 1] v[γ, 2] v[γ,K − 1] v[γ,K]
...
...
· · ·
Figure 2: The ring of trees structure for Kann’s embedding of 3SAT-B into 3DM-3.
The red edges are tree edges. In addition to the tree shown, the ring of trees contains
(identical) trees for each ui[γ] and ui[γ]. In the example pictured, γ ranges from 1 to
4. The root vertices are labeled ui[1], ui[1], . . . , ui[di], ui[di] where di is the number of
occurrences of ui or its negation in I. As described in Lemma A.1, an optimal matching in
the ring of trees can be obtained by a consistent choice of all blue or green vertices in all
the rings associated to ui, then covering as many remaining vertices as possible with tree
edges (a greedy “leaf to root” approach works). It is clear that such a matching will cover
all vertices, except for half of the root vertices (those corresponding to either ui or ui).
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